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ABSTRACT
There has been a wide variety of research on worker—hours
substi tution aridthe effectsof variouscostson the speed and
extent to which labor demand adjusts. Much of this1iterature
t.houghconfuses varioustypesof fixed costs and fails to provide a
guidefor identifying how chanQes in labor—cost structures affect
static relative demands for workers and hours and the paths by which
they adjust. This study presents a typology o-f labor cost
structures and examines how they affect these and other aspects of
labor demand. Some ofthemany recently adopted changeE.in1 abor-
marketpolicies in OECD countriesare pigeonhol ed bytheireffects
on labor cc'sts.
Areviewcf the cvi dence indicates clearly that there is some
slightsubstitution between workers andhoursalong a constant
effecti ye—i abor I soquarit..The evidence is clear that erripl oyers
adjust the demand for hours more rapidly than that for workers and
that both adjust fairly rapidly.It also shows that a major effect
of cost-increasing policies designed to induce substitution from
hours to workersisa reduction in the total amountof worker—hours
demanded.Original analysis demonstrates that lags in the adjustment
of employmentinresponseto chanctes in demandlengthened inmost
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I
LOl \/Ei.t:.-! c:.jEcj juL-L.c..ci Lvpci.J.CiOL.::uflE. put resf:r1ct.ior'L
un .:ysrs L:rbe±urc•::ir:,arar a di api. aced sun'e provi cia
IC..L:fflE? sac: nu : t.y t c::c.:)r k c-:r'cc af tsrciiap1 ac::ament and at i 1. 1 others
+ac" at 'L r satmeni: o±ap ec i f i C: groups o-f war Per a when permanent
1 ayc.:+ + a ar c. c::onternpl ated1 hey are al so di, verse i n or I g I n :Some
annncajotiated between unions and management, chi is others are
I rcpc:;sod by covernmerit
My purpose hero is to provide the background -For examining how
these poiicies a-ffeat 1 abor demandReferenceis made tospeci+ i c
exampi Os. but present ng the details o-f thearrayof speci -Fic
policies is 1 c-ft. to others.The nature of 1 abor costs is discussed
andlinked to empioyers optimizing behavior in the -face of
di + fer i nq cost structures.Soththe stat: i c demand for 1 abor the
amount Cif employment and hours generated on average ----— and
-fluctuations in empi oyment and hours ——— 1 abor—market dynamics
are discussed. The outcome is a guide to the qualitative effects of
current and proposed policies on thedemandfor laborAn
exam1naton of empiric:ai results on the effects of structures of
labor costs on employment most of which are unfortunately general
rather than linked to specific policies) then suggests the potential
quantitative impacts of the various policies.
II.TheNatureof Labor Demand and Labor Costs
Inthissection [ categorize labor costs facing employers and
examine thei r impactsonthe level of and changes in profit—'
maxi mi zinq labor inputs. [ignore theeffectsof di 'Fferences in
1averane labor costs among groups of workers, as I have analyzed
and summarized evidence on them elsewhere (Hamermesh, 1986).
A. Fixed E.ploym.ntCosts
The simplest example of a labor—cost structure is a fixed cost
per worker, V, that the employer must pay each time period no matter
how many hours a particular worker's services are utilized or how
much the worker's hourly labor cost is. Examples of such costs
include employer—provided health insurance (life insurance too in
some cases); clerical costs of maintaining payroll and other records
on the worker; and, in the United States, the (relatively low level
of) taxes that finance unemployment insurance benefits.a
Following Rosen (1978), assume that the total cost of labor
is W(H)EH+VE, where W is the hourly wage rate, expressed as a
function of hours per worker, and H is the average hours worked per
employee. Then the marginal cost of a worker is WH+V; the cost of
an extra hour of labor is approximately EWCI+p], where E is total
employment, and p is the elasticity of the wage rate with respect
to hours. Under certain simplifying assumptions p is the premium
rate for overtime work.(I assume overtime is worked, but that it
constitutes a small fraction of total hours.) Assume that
production is characterized by.
Cl) Q =FCK,G(E,H)),
where K is the typical firm's capital input.I assume here that
employment—hours substitution is separable from capital—labor
substitution, which may or may not be correct.3
Consider the effect of an increase in V if 14 remains constant.
Labor costs per worker rise, so that the cost of a given number of
2war ker—hoursri ses.ihi s :i ncrease has three separate effects.,
Firstandmostohviousi y,thescaleeffectreduces employers labor
demand bythe product of thelabor—demand elastI city andthe
percentage increase in total labor costs for a given empi oyment
1 sve.1One i inpact ofthisincrease is thusadec:l insinEH, total
worker—hours demanded
The sec::ond impact is a substitution effect on the firms
re].ativsdemand for employees and hours, The rel ati vs price of
these two laborinputs, EWH+V]/[EW(l±p)Jrises, inducir
substi tutic3n away from employment andtoward hours,As 1. onoas some
substitutionis possible,theimposed changewi 11 induce erripi oyers
tolengthenworkweeks byaddingovertime hoursand reducing
employmentto achieve a givenrate ofoutput. At a givenwagerate
and a constant premium for overtime work, increased fixed costs of
employing a worker cause a decrease in the employment—hours ratio.
The third effect is more subtle and arises from the
heterogeneity of labor inputs. Assume for analytical simplicity
that there are only two types of labor, working H1 and H hours
respectively, and that the firm uses E1 and E employees in each
category. Total labor costs are then
(2) EEW (H)H +VJE1,
where the subscript i refers to the particular group of labor.
Assume that production is characterized by
(1'> Q= FK,GE1,H1,E,H
so that labor inputs are still assumed to be separable fromcapital.
Iffixed costs c-f employment increase by the same nominal amount,
the rel ativeprices a-femployment and hours of the two types ofworker change in proportion only if "i±V, p±p, W±W, and their
employment and hours are the same, if the two groups a-f
workers are functionally identical, so that the case is
uni nteresti ng.
In general a constant nominal increase in the fixed costof
employmentrepresents a greater percentage increasein the price of
worker—hours of low—than of hi gh—wage empl oyees arid a qreater
increaseintheprice of employment relative to hours amonglow— than
among high—skilid workers If allsix pairs of employment—hours
combinations are p—substitutes, and labor is separablefrom capital,
a constant nominal increase in V and Vwill induce substitution
away from low--skilled worker—hoursand toward high—skilled labor (in
addition to the substitution away from labor generallyand toward
capital) Moreover, within each group ofworkers there will be
substitution toward greater hours per worker, with greater
substitution toward more hours per low—skilled empioyee
Underdi.fferent assumptionsabout the natureof production
thisconclusion does not. nocessari ly stand upFor example suppose
hoursof each type c:f worker must be the same (H and H are perfect
p—complements), perhaps because a plant must operatefor a shi ft o-f
a given duratic:r'i Wewillstill observearelative decrease in
total worker--hours of low—skilled employees, because therewill he a
relative dec:i inc i ri empi oymeritof I nw--skilied workers; but hours per
worker will change i dent i. call y forboth groups
When the assumpti on a-f separab. 11 ty of c:apital-from labor in
(1 )ic; relaxed, it becomes difficult. to draw general conclusions
about. the effects of chanc}es in f i. xed costs One mi oht, for
4cx ampi e i maqi ne that machine—t.endersmust work in shifts n-f + I xed
durati on whi 1 e hour-s per worker of other ompi oyees are not
complementary wi Lb the intensity of capital utilizationEn that
case a rise in the + I xed costs n-f empl nyi rigmac:hine--tenders will
reduce their empi oymen'l: hut itwill, alsoreduce the rate of
ut1ization of capital and c:ould increase the ratio n-f employment to
hours among other workers, depending on the relevant substitution
elasticities Clearly, once one disaci-gregates labor and abandons
capitai-labor separability, very little can be concludedjgi
A large array of policies can he viewed asmi xirgimposed
changes in hourly labor costs and fixed employment costs
Increases in payroll tax rates to finance taxes on which there is a
ceilingon earnings, and increases in the ceiling at a constant tax
rate, raise the cost of employment if the ceiling is low, and have
no effect on the cost of an addit ional hourThey are both
equivalent to increases in fixed employment costs If the ceiling
is higher the effect of these changes on the relative size of fixed
and variable employment costs may differ
Reductions in the standard workweek (that require penalty
rates on hoursbeyondthe normal week) raise the fixed cost of
employment,sincethe cost of an additional worker is raised by the
penalty times the reduction in thenormal workweek; but the cost of
anadditional. hour also increases for employees who had been
working marginally less than the previous standard weeks The net
impact depends on thedistributionof hours per worker before the
change was imposed Changes in the penalty rate for overtime pay,
and restri ctions on the amount cf overtime that may be used, areother examples. In each case the impacts of the pure policy on
labor—labor and employment—hours substitution will be attenuated
because the marginal cost of an additional hour is raised; but, to
the extent that the fixed—cost component of the change dominates,
the ratio of employment to hours and the mix of workers employed
will change in the directions indicated above. However, the
potentially ambiguous effect of mixed policies underscores the
importance of analyzing the specifics of each proposed change.
B. Costs of changing Employment
A variety of natural and imposed labor costs accompanies gross
changes in a firm's employment. Costs of searching for and
processing new employees, including advertising costs and part of
the overhead costs of maintaining a personnel department; initial
training costs (those that must be incurred to make the employee
minimally productive in the firm), to the extent the employer shares
in these costs; and payroll costs that accompany layoffs, including
higher payroll taxes or direct payments, are some examples.
Most of the analysis of the cost of adjusting employment has
assumed that the average cost increases the larger is the change in
employment. The assumption is embodied in Figure 1A in the positive
slope of CK.' That average costs are increasing is usually
rationalized by pointing to an ever—greater disruption of the firm's
operations as the change in employment increases. Consider a
standard downward—sloping labor—demand schedule, D1 (shown in Figure
18), with the firm confronted by an imposed increase in the hourly
cost of labor, from W0 to W2. We deal here with a decrease in
equilibrium employment; a rise in employment can be handled mutatis









EFmutandis withasimilar analysis..In the absenceof adjustment
c:ostsempioycrient would -fail from E0 to Es..With thesecosts
though.an immediate drop in empi oyment engenders casts equal to
OAFD inFigure iPi:Making the entire adjustment at once leads to
verylarge transac:tions costs..The profit—maximizing firm can do
betterthan this for exampleq by ma::ing half the adjustment in the
first. time periodq and the ather half in the next.. While the firm
sacrifices profits in the amount DBE in Figure lB when it is away
fromits new static profit—maximizingposition this loss is more
thanoffset by the saving inadjustmentcosts.. These latter are
only OHE ——— twotimes the per—period cost of making the
adjustment.. ThefirmsavesEHFDof adjustment costs, a larger
amountthanthe DBE of static profits that it foregoes..
Increasing average costs of adjustment thus lead firms to
spread outchangesin employment when a permanent change in wages
is imposed. In general the adjustment takesforever,with
employmentapproaching the newstatic equilibrium asymptotically
(seethe (ppendix).. The bulk of attention t.o these casts has been
focussed on their effects on the timing of adjustment.. Consider now
how the timing is affected when average costs increase, for example
by anupward shift fromCF(to CK..Even though the average cost of
a particular adjustment is greater the gain to spreading the costs
over two periods is still the difference between the rectangle EHFD
and the triangle DBE.. Onlyif the line CF(becomes steeper
average costs rise more rapidly wi t.h larger adj ustments tha.n before
will the rate of adjustment to a new equi ii bri urn be sl c:'wer..
Consi der how the firm behaves if the veraqe cost isa nde::endent of the size of the adjustment.Except.forthe-
possaba ii ty c-fancr easi nc disruptionto operations asthesi z e
the emp 1 oyment c:hange :1 ncr-eases •independenceappears to bea good
characteri zati on c-f the naturec:'-f adjustmentcosts, especially i yen
the absenceof any cvideric:oon this I ssue.In this case the line CK
I n Fl gure 1Abecomes hor 1 z ontal atC'' K'Thereis no savi noc-F
adjustment costs i-fthecut. in empioymentis spread over two
pen ods. and the + I rmlosespro-fits in theamountDEjE-forone
period.With the average cost independent c-F the size of the
—.4.•--.---4- -.----.— 4—.--.44-.--.—.--..,-_4-_--_S.-.-4-.-_-- ..-4- C:,. jL.-w,i,w, L qLfltt: .LUt L.I}CU L.CJ L I ICY,. fit UI 1. U IIICt, 4. IIIk £ IILj WIUfJ.S L,YIII&, IL
levelin one jump !±i.stLflapioia (Rothschild, 1971)
The+ j rcr maynot though, vary emplayment at allAssumethat
the ri se in W is permanentIf the total cost of the change, the
areaOAC"G.exceeds the present value c-f the gainin pro-Fits from
making the change, thetrianqleABF divided bythediscount rate,
the-firm will hold employment at E0 Moregenerally,the greater
are the total costs ofadjustment, the stickier employment will be
in response to shocks to product demand or wages. Adjustments may
be spread out or concentr-ated in oneperiod;but as shown inthe
Appendix,reardl ess-of the slope c-f theaveragecost asthe size of
theadj ustment changes, an increase in the cost. of making the
adjustment reduces the van ationinempi oymentin response toa
givendemandshack.
Thepresence of adjustment costs changes the average level of
employment in each time period (see Nickell,1978). Consider a two--
period case, inwhic:h period 1 is characterized byhigh product















£Mp1cy:4ent iti PerioJ 2
FIgIW? 2Bperiod 2labor demand is reduced tot)shownin Figure 2BThe
wagerate is constant at W0, and there are adi stment costsof(JR
perworker di scharciedI-f there were no such costs, the 'firm would
set employment at E1 and E in periods 1 and 2 respectively.If it
does sc, in the presence of thesecosts, it incurs additi onal costs
ofEFGH. The -firm couldmakehigher profits overthecyclei-fit
reducedits first—periodemployment andraised itssecond-period
employment.Indeed, itshouldset
employmentatlevels and suchthat thesum ofthe triangles
FGH inFigure2A and ABC inFigure2B is just equal to therectangle
E'F'GHin Figure2ELAdjustmentcosts thus lead to smoothing of
-fluctuations infactor' demandover the cycle.
Adjustmentcosts, like any other factor cost, also reduce the
averagefactor input. Moregenerally, adjustment costs reduce
average employment bya greateramount1) The greater the per—
worker cost is; 2)Thegreater the firms rate of time preference;
and 3) The greater the firms elasticity of demand for labor. I-f
adjustmentcosts differ among workers, the firm will also substitute
labor of one type for that of another. If, for example, the average
cost over an entire business cycle of employing older workers rises
due to an increase in the cost of laying them off5 their employment
will fall relative to that of younger workers (unless their supply
is perfectly inelastic and relative wages are flexible).
In the standard anal ysi s exposi ted above, asymmetries between
hiring and discharge costs were ignored, so that increases and
decreases in employment were treated identically.'7 It should be
clear from the list of the sources of adjustment costs that there is
9no reason to expect the cost of a hire to be the same as that of a
discharcie. The totalcostsof the change or the variation a-f
averacie cost. with the size a-f the chanQe need not be the same for
hires anddischarges. The costs of searchingfor and processing new
workersare entirely different from layoff costs. This distinction
sugQeststhat theelasticity of employment with respect to a
particular demand shockandthe length of the lag in the response to
thatshock will varywith its direction.
C. Indirect and Potential Costs of Adjustment
-
Athirdvariety ofnonwage casts that affect firms' behavior
differentlyfrom wages and fringes are costs imposed by regulation
of the apcess ofadjustingemployment. In some senses these are
similar to thecostsdiscussed above.I distinguish them here
because they relate to less aggregated problems of adiustment such
as who may be laid off,1 what information must beprovidedto
employeesq etc. Considerfirst regulations on the order in which
workersare laid off. Included in suchregulations are
collectively--bargainedrequirements that layoffs be made according
to inverse seniorityq and legal restrictions onlayoffs of more
seniorworkers. These regulations will not impose anycost on the
firmi-f the wacie paid to each worker exactly reflects his/her
productivity. in that case the firm can abide by the regulatic'ris at
no cost for it would be mdi +-ferent about the order of layoffs in
their absence.
The more likely case is that wages increase with tenure:
(3) W =F(TN),F :>0,F'0,
whereW is the wage rate and TN isthe worker' s seniity. The
1 0positive relationship may be due to shared investment in firm—
specific training (Becker, 1964) or be part of some long—term
implicit contract between the worker and the firm (Lazear, 1951).
Assume also that productivity rises with tenure:
(4) ii =S(TN),6' > 0,
where n is the worker's productivity per period, and that F—6
increases monotonically with TN. We assume more senior workers earn
a wage above their current productivity as part of some optimal
long—term implicit contract, perhaps because this wage—productivity
relationship induces higher lifetime output by workers.
Alternatively, the excess of wages over productivity among more
senior workers might be "explained" by custom.
Assuming now that there are no other costs of layoff or of
hiring, how will the employer behave in the presence of fluctuations
in product demand? The regulation of layoffs by inverse seniority
obviously imposes an adjustment cost on the firm. However, the
average cost is decreasing with the size of the adjustment: A
small adjustment requires that the least senior worker-, whose
productivity exceeds the wage by the greatest amount, be laid off.
That first layoff is quite costly. As more layoffs are made in a
particular time period, the cost per layoff declines, as more senior
workers, forwhomW—u is greater, become subject to layoff. With a
declining average cost of adjustment, it pays the firm to
concentrate in one period all the layoffs it intends to make in
response to expected changes in product demand. As in Section B
above, though, the imposition of adjustment costs makes the employer
less likely to change employment in response to a particular shift
11-in product demand, and reduces the size of adjustments that do
occur. These costs also represent an increase in total cost per
worker, leading firms to reduce average employment over the cycle.
If wages do not equal productivity, the imposition of this
regulation will lead to changes in relative employment by seniority.
In the short run the work force will clearly become more senior; but
with the regulation the cost of employing more senior workers rises
relative to that of more junior workers, especially in those firms
whose product demand is more variable. This change in relative
costs leads employers to undertake policies, such as a flattening of
the wage—tenure profile, that eventually change the quit—tenure
relationship and raise the ratio of junior to senior employees.
Even if no layoffs ever occur, the possibility of layoffs being
conducted under inverse seniority, coupled with the systematic
departure of wage rates from productivity, induces employers to seek
a less senior work force.
This point applies equally well to other restrictions on
layoffs that differ by seniority. If restrictions are imposed on
laying off more senior workers, employers will seek to substitute
junior for senior workers by changing wage structures to alter the
quit—tenure relationship. Conversely, if junior workers are
protected, employers will try to steepen wage—tenure profiles and
induce senior workers to remain on the job longer. Any restriction
on severing members of a particular group of employees will lead
employers to hire other groups of workers in preference to them.'
A second potential cost of adjustment is the requirement that
information about planned changes in labor demand be made public.
- 12The extent of employers' opposi ti on to such a requirement suqqests
:L t woui ci reduc:e prof it. Ore canview requi red prenoti f i cat. on as an
inc:rease in labor costsz alt.ernative1y it might be viewed as a
fixed c:c:st of empi oyi nq any laborUnder either vi owonecan in-for
that i t would reduce the aggregate amount c-f labor demanded over the
business cycle.It woulddo this irf existing plants ardq perhaps
more important, inhibit the formation of new capital that is p
compl ementary with the types a-f labor bi ng protected
Its potential effects are mare complex than thjSq however.
Wcarl::ers' ear]. icr awareness that their jobs are in jeopardy will 1 eaci
them to change any decisions that affect the extent to which they
are tied to their current employers. Investment in firm—
specifictraining will be reduced sothatthe stock of firm—specific
human capital will be smaller than otherwise at the time the layoff
occurs (Hamermeshq 1987). The rcduced investment will increase
workers' likelihood a-f quitting for the discrepancy between their
current wage and their alternative wages elsewhere will be reduced.
Ta the extent that workers do not anticipate layoffs or plant
closings well requirements of openness about themwillinduce a
more rapid reallocation of labor to expanding industries. However,
thoseworkers with the greatest past investment in training specific
to the firm (and to the industry, if the entire industry is
endangered) may act on the information by seeking governmental
protection for their employers; with greater specific investment
public requirements of notification are more likely to lead to
increased voice rather than more rapid exit.
Thepotential improvement in overall economic efficiencyproduced by publicity about impending ].ayoffscomes atacost to the
dcciin:i ng firm and perhaps tothose workerswho remainwith that
firmWith employees bearing areducedshare offirm—specific
investment,the firm's profits will decline still more rapidly than
in the absence of the requirement, assuming the government does not
try to protect the firm. lsa if, asIassumed above, the
difference between wages and productivity rises with tenure, the
firmwillbe left with an increasingly older stock of workers as the
date of layoff or plant closing approaches Under the assumptions
we have made this will lower profits still further andhasten the
reductioninemployers'demand for labor and the date at which the
layoffs occur or the plant closest
D. Partial Coverage
The discussion has assumed that each particular job—security
policy applies uniformly to all workers and firms (This assumption
hasbeenimplic:it in our useof a typicalfirm as the focus c-f
analysis)[n reality, though, the policies do not apply equally to
all employees in a firm, all firms in an industry or all industries
intheeconomy. Most are characterized by partial coverage, which
changes their impact on the economy and allowsroomfor their net
effects t.o belessthan their gross effects on the firms to which
they applydi.rectly
Consi der, for e>ampl e, a pci icy that i ncreases adJ ustment
costs in a particular sector of the economy l1the effects we
discussedi. n sc'cti onII. B. above applyinthat sectorHowever,
employees ho are not working in this sector because o-f the
incrcased laborcost will + ndworkin theuncoveredsec:tor, if real
14wages in that sector can fall to absorb the increased supply. The
policy of partial coverage thus leads to a reduction in the size of
•the covered sector and an expansion in the uncovered sector. This
kind of two—tier policy gives employers a continuing incentive to
substitute unprotected for protected workers and to contract
services out to firms in the unprotected sector.
Partial coverage also affects the propensity of covered
workers to quit their protected Jobs. Since these jobs must be
rationed (because of the supply of uncovered workers seeking them),
incumbents are less likely to quit, for the alternative is a lower—
payingj insecure job in the uncovered sector. Obversely, those in
the uncovered sector have an increased probability of quitting, for
the lower wage rates there combine with the attraction of protected
jobs to induce more turnover. The economy—wide impact on turnover
of job—security policies involving partial coverage is unclear.
III.Analysisof Job Security Provisions
In this section 1 pigeonhole a variety of policies that have
been undertaken to promote job security. While the set examined is
by no means exhaustive, it is sufficiently representative to provide
indications of how other policies might be categorized in light of
the theoretical discussion.I discuss the policies in the order in
which the various types of costs were considered in Section II.
A.Policies Affecting Fixed Costs
Inthe United Kingdom and the FRG a number of industries have
collectively negotiated a ouaranteed oeriodic oavment (Gennard,
1979, pp. 43, 51). Such a policy converts an hourly, variable cost
into a fixed cost exactly like those we discussed in Section II.A.
15is suchi t wi 1 1 reduce €:mpi oyers demand for new wor kors even
further bel ow what I t. would have been reduce the tc:tal numberc-f
empioyees but raise hours worked b those remainin employed.In
the lony rung i nsc;far as 1 abor beconics more c-f a -f xed cost the
policy wi 11 be a barn er to new + I rms entori ng t:he industry,
In 1975 Br i t:i sh Steel nec'ti ated an agreement .o limit
overtimework. This rstri cti on is analogous to an increased
pena). ty rate for overti inc wc::rk:except that the penalty is in-f iri te
after some amount of overtime hours used(If the ban were total
the c:ivertirne penalty would be infinite for even the first hour c-f
overtime work. >Assuming the limit is effective (the -Firm would
otherwise have used more overtime) this pci IL ' offsets -fIxed
employment costs and induces firms to substitute workers for haurs
Shorter workweeks have been introduced in several countries
recentlyThus France chaned the standard workweek to 39 hours in
1982. The c-f fect of such chariQcs is uncl ear it depends as we saw
in Section II.A., on the distribution c-f current employees by the
amount c-f hours worked per week. Many governments offer subsidies
to short-ti me work as in Japan where only reductions of entire
days are subsi di zed or in the FRG France anc:t ltd y where
reductions in hours generally are encouraged (Gennard 1985) Suc:h
policies lower the pricE:' cf workers relative to hours and provide an
incentive to substi tute addi t I onal workers -for 1 anger workweeks.
B.Policies Affecting Adjustment Costs
The1.965 Redundanc:y Payments Act in the Uni ted Kingdom offered
workers lump—sum payments i -f they were i nvo] untar i 1 y severed through
no -Ft of their own payments that, were i n some c:asczston:'ped up
16by coliectively-neç1otiatedplans(Gennard i979pp 41 6) Such
provi si crs represent adjustment costs in whi c:h the averane cost i s
probably constant.If SOq the policy will inhibit layoffI:i...t. will
ensure that any 1 ayoffs that do c:ccur are lumped together. In
addi ti on the imposition of redundancypay will inhibit eipl ayers
from expandinci empi oyment when product demand rises arid wi Ii. result
inloweremployment on average. Most, redundancy payments e g.
those created through collective negoti at ion i rr some German
ndust.rjes (Gennard 1979 p increase with years of serv:Lce.
i-f the more seni or workers are no more productive than junior
workers the ratio of their cost to thei. r productivity relative to
that of junior workers rises. Thiswillinduce employers to
substitute toward more junior workers.
The United Kingdom's Temporary Employment Subsidy provided
fixed payments to employerswho agreed to forego laying off
employees who would otherwise have been discharged (Gennard 19795
p. 31);Swedenoffers training subsidies linked to workers' wage
rates to employers who forego layoffs (McKersie—Senenbergerq 1983)
These policies bsidize retention of workers and thus implicitly
raise the relative cost of adjustment As such, firms are less
likely to vary employment over the cycle. However becauselabor
costs are subsidized, employment expands beyond what it otherwise
wouldhavebeen in those firms that qualify for the subsidy.In
that sense, the policy can be viewed as a cost reductionin
decliningindustries
These policies are aimed particularly at collective layoffs
A host of specific policies designed to protect against unfair
17dismissals ofindividualshasarisenin Western Europe. Most
(Gerinard1985) define fairdismissalintermsonly of a worker's
conductand provide for appeals to courts or labor tribunals. To
some extent these policies do raise the cost of workers relative to
hours and thus tend to reduce employment—hours ratios. They are
thouchq explicitly related to adJustment. and as such they induce
the effects that we noted inSection II.B.
Inthe past several years there has been some loosening of the
policiesthat have raisedadjustment costs, bathancollective
layoffs and individual dismissals. For example, the FF<Sin198
increasedthefractionofthe work force scheduledfarlayoff before
theprovisionsof protective legislation become effective and
exempted new firms fromthe legislationentirely.Spainin1980
reducedthe amount of redundancy paymentsrequired to be awarded to
workerslaid off because of economicfactors (Gennard 1985). There
hasal sc:' been a general loosening of the restrictions on individual
diSmissals to allow the invocation of economic necessity as a
.j usti. f i cati on f or such layoffs, 411 these changes reduce the
impacts we noted above: They make adjustments more likely than
under the more rigid leqislation and they increase average
empl oyment in the sectors covered by the 1 eqi sl at ion.
C.Policies That Produce Indirect Costs
Lffby_inverse senioriticharacterizesmost collect:ive
agreements in the United States andtheUnited Kingdom. In the FRG,
France and Italy legislation requires that length o-f service and
personal ci rcumstanc:es be i nd uded amonc4 the consi c:Ierat.i ons
governing the order of layc:'ffs The effect a-f these provi sions on
:1.8employment fluctuations is, as I showed in Section II, unclear *
priori. Assume, however, that they impose costs on the employer
because they impose a different ordering from the (private) cost—
minimizing ordering that the employer would choose. If so, they
induce all the short— and long—run effects on employment, wage
structures and mobility that were discussed in Section II.C. Most
important in terms of aggregate employment, they reduce cyclical
fluctuations, and also reduce average levels of employment.
Limits or bans on hiring have been introduced through
collective negotiations in the Berman steel industry and elsewhere
(Bennard, 1979, pp. 63, 72). Assuming that employers would hire
workers into some jobs while discharging them from others, such a
ban represents an additional adjustment cost. It will reduce
employment fluctuations while raising labor costs, thus reducing the
average amount of labor demanded.
Prenotification of impending plant closings or major layoffs
must be provided to governments and/or employee representatives in a
number of OECD countries. In the United Kingdom, Italy and the FRG
prenotification must be given to certain workers even in cases of
impending individual dismissals. All such requirements operate as
indicated in Section lIt They affect the speed with which
adjustments take place, the willingness of firms to invest in new
capital equipment and of workers and firms to invest in training,
and the mobility patterns of workers in the affected firms.
D. The PartialCoverage ofJab—Security Legislation
Awidevariety of restrictions in the various provisions of
job—security legislation make that legislation conform to the model
19of partial coverage that was outlined in Section II.D. For
example:1) Canada is considering requiring that part—time
employees (those working more than 20 hours per week) be covered by
pensions (effectively decreasing problems that arise from partial
coverage of protective legislation);'° 2) Exemptions from job—
security legislation exist for workers and firms that do not meet
various criteria (Gennard, 1985). Thus in the United Kingdom claims
of unfair dismissal are not allowed for employees with less than two
years of seniority. The seniority requirement is even more
stringent for part—time employees. In Italy some of the legislation
excludesemployersof fewerthan 35 workers, while in the FRG
employersof fewer than 5 workers are excluded from employment
protection legislation generally; 3) In Germany and Italy
prenotification requirements are much more stringent for white— than
for blue—collar workers.
To theextent that employers cansubstitute part— for full—
time workers exemptions will result in an expansion of the part—time.
work force. Similarly, they should favor the relative expansion of
smaller enterprises, especially in those sectors in which economies
ofscale do not exist or are not very substantial. Indeed, to the
extentthat substitution by employers and consumers is possible,
exemptions from the panoply ofjob—security legislation may have
created the beginning of two—tier societies, one with rigid job—
securityrequirements covering high—paid, senior, full—time workers
in large firms, the other more flexible, with part—time, low—paid,
insecureworkers in small businesses. The high—paid tier will
contract because of the imposed rigidity, while the low—paid tier
will expand. 20IV. Evidence on the Effects of Labor Costs
Pi.FixedCosts and Employment—Hours Substitution
The mostimportantemp.ricalissue tohe addressedis whether
employers'production funct.ions allow for subti tution .:!IgjJ_g.
isi betWEE?n ernp1oyment.aridhoureperwor k erTo thE' e::. terit. such
subst.i tuti on is possible, pal i. ci es that produce rel ati ye increases
in -fixed empi oyment c:osts bi as cirpi oyers toward reduc i rig empi oyme'rt.
andincreasing hours, There aretwostrandsofliterature that bear
on this issue.The fl ret exami r'es empi oyment—-hours trade—o++s in
the contextofstandard labor—demand equati one without actual 1 y
attempting to measure relative + I xed and variable costs Whi.l e it
cannottherefore, providedirectevidence onthe effectof changes
in labor—coststructures on the mix of employment and hours, itcan
informus whether an increase i n the use of hours decreases or
increasesthedemand for workers ata + i xedlevel of outputThe
secondstrandtries tomeasurecost structures and, in mostcases,
toexamine how they affectemployers' demands for civertime
Recentevidence from standard labor—demand equations on this
issue is quite mixedFrU.S. manufacturinc,i9é-—1981 II, Rossana
(1983) estimates amodel of the demandfor hours as afunctionof
employmentlevels, measuresof output and orders, and realwages.
Thistype ofmodel is insp:ired, as are similarmodelsdiscussedin
thisSection, by Nadiri--Rosen (1969). The estimates suggestthat
foreach 10—percent long—run increase in employment there is a
percent drop inhoursper workerSimilar equati crs in Rossana
(198) estimated using monthly U.S. data far 1959—19826 over six
two—digit SIC industries find no significant effect of the stock of
21employees on the dcmand 'for hours.. Somewhatperplexing,though,
sinc::e they imply an asymmetry, equations describing employment
demand for the same industries mostly show a small but significant
psiUve effect of hours per' worker on the demand far'workers..
However sincethe hours and employmentequations werenotestimated
jointly,thisasymmetry may be aresult of the estimation technique
(orperhaps ofa specific:ation having little grounding in
rnicroec:onomic:theory).. Yamamoto (1982) finds negative effects of
employment on hours per worker and vice—versa using quarterly data
for Japanese manufacturing from1970—1978..Howeverq the sample
period is quite short so it is unclear whether these really
represent long—run relationships..
Onestudy on U..S.. data using similarmodels but decomposing
output changes into permanent and transitory coinpanents estimates
the si z e o-fanhours—employment trade—off using data on overt i me
hours(Craw+ord 1979)..For manufacturing 1958—1976 (monthly), it
finds a small but significant positive relationship between
employment levels and the demand for hours.. Comparing this result
to those cited above it seems quite clear that this approach
provides little evidence of a long—run trade—off between employment
andnormalhours,I e..ofwhether hours and employment are
substitutes or complements. This maybebecause sucha trade—off
truly doesnotexistEviderice + or theverylong run suggests hours
perweek aredetermined mainly byworkers' preferences, not by
product i on technol c:gy(seeHmermesh--Rees, 1984) ..However,insofar
asthese studies do not.even attempt to measure the relative costs
ofhours and workers, their' lack of cvi dence isnot. too critical
._),Several studies of the demand + or overtime hours have attempted
to divide employment costs into fixed and variable components.
Their choice of data allows for much greater variability in the
underlying marginal costs of employment and hours, and thus at least
makes it possible to measure the extent of substitution of
employment for hours. The three analyses for the U.S. summarized in
Ehrenberg—Schumann (1982) and that study itself all suggest that
higher fixed costs of employment do reduce the long—run employment—
hours ratio. ln all these studies, though, the trade—of fs are quite
smalls A one—third increase in the relative cost of an hour of
overtime would produce no more than a 4 percent decline in the ratio
of overtime to other hours. A somewhat larger effect is produced
for West Germany using time—series data, 1964—1983, by Iconig—
Pohlmeier (1996;.
Using annual data, 1951—1981, for West Germany, Hart—Kawasaki
(1986) decompose payments to labor, particularly payroll taxes, into
fixed and variable measures and examine their effects on employment
and hours. Their model treats hours, employment and the capital
stock as jointly determined by their lagged values, fixed and
variable payroll taxes, output, nonwage fixed and variable labor
costs, and capital costs. The authors find surprisingly that a cut
in the payroll—tax ceiling in a tax structure with a high ceiling
relative to the average wage level increases employment and reduces
hours per worker. They attribute this perverse result to their use
of a model that includes both capital and labor. Hart—Kawasaki
(1986) also produce the expected finding that decreased variable
payroll taxes reduce the employment/hours ratio.
23While the evidence seems fairly clear that an increase in the
fixed costs of employment induces only slight substitution away from
workers and toward hours, holding total worker—hours constant, that
does not mean the negative employment effects of job—security
policies that impose fixed employment costs are small. Elsewhere
(Hamermesh, 1986) I have summarized an immense body of evidence on
the elasticity of labor demand with respect to labor costs. The
overwhelming bulk of studies that usemodernestimation techniques
finds that the net (including all adjustments among firms) long—run
constant—output labor—demand elasticity characterizing broad
aggregates of industries is between .1 and .5. The total
elasticity, which allows for scale effects, is larger still. That
being the case, policies that increase the fixed costs of employment
may reduce the employment—hours ratio only slightly, but can effect
substantial reductions in the total amount of worker—hours employed.
B.Adjustment Casts andLagged Labor Demand
There is a huge mass of empirical evidence demonstrating that
the demand for workers and hours lags behind output. Moreover, the
lags in the adjustment of employment are greater than those in the
adjustment of hours per worker. Hamermesh (1976) summarizes a large
number of early studies demonstrating this fact. More recent
evidence corroborates this conclusion in more carefully specified
models. Using a model like that of Nadiri—Rosen (1969), but
decomposing changes in product demand into expected and unexpected
components, Topel (1982) suggests a similar conclusion based on data
for1958—1975 for six U.S. manufacturing industries. For the
automobile industry Chang (1983) demonstrates this both for the
24United States and for the state of Michigan..
The averane length of the lags ofemploymentand hours behind
output changesisnot so closely determined as are their rd at i ye
1 encths. However the cvi dencesumrnarI ed I n Hamermesh (1976)
suiests that. near-i y all the adjustment iscompi eted i thin one
year.Recent studies of the FRGandFranc:e (Bucher, 1984) using
si ml icrtechnques produce similar results. Early studies on
aggregateU.S. data (Sargent 197Grn and Meese1980)that paidclose
attention to the structure of expectations and its implications for
error terms in the estimating equations found very long lags c-f
employment behind output (average length overoneyear>These may
wellbeartifacts of theestimating procedure rather than reversals
of previous evidence. More recently Shapiro (1986) has employed a
dynamic expectational model of the adjustment of production iabor
nonproduction labor and capital that suggests that adjustment lags
for workers exceed those for hours per workerq and that the lags are
not very long.It seems safe to conclude that the lags in adjusting
labor inputs are fairly short.
Theoretical work underlying the estimation of lagged factor
adjustment rests on the theory of adjustment costs., in most cases on
an increasing average cost. Whether empirical results stem from
these costs has not. been demonstrated.. However, Morrison—Berndt
(1981) use annual US. data for 1952-1971 to show that the
adjustmentofnonproduction worker employment to chanes in output
demand is muchslower than that of production workers. (ssuming
thatadjustment costs are quadraticq Shapiro (1986) infers that they
are sub'stantial for adjustments of nonproduction worker labor, but
25quite smallfor adjustmentsofproduction workers. Similar findings
are reported for thc' British encjineerinQ sector for 196:3—1978 by
Njsim (jQ34),1isode Pelsmacker (1984) finds the same
qualitative results for Beician autc:' plants from 1976 through 1982.
ssuming that the lags arise from adjustment costs there is
some evidence that these costs are asymmetric. Hamermesh (1969)
demonstrates for a group of three— and four—digit SIC LLS.
manufact.urincj industries that the lag of layoffs behind output
changes is shorterthan that of new hires behind output chnges.
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rapidlythan that of employment declines. What this finding implies
about potential asymmetries in the effects of job—security policies
is unclear without a specification of how those policies affect
adjustment c:osts.
The short-run effects of specific policies have received very
little serious empirical attention. Nickell (1979) examined British
manufacturing data 195—1976 and found that the lag in employment
rose during this periods while the lag in hours declined. He
attributed these changes to the increased requirements of job—
security policies. More recently Nickell (1982) showed that between
1967 and 1977 an i rjc:reasein the useof unfaa r dismissal legislation
caused a reduction in both hiring and flows from employment with
thelatterdominating (so that the net effect was a reducti on in
unemployment). For the United States Hamermesh (1978) showed that
expansic:n of theunemployment insurance program which is financed
bywhat:1. s assent i a]. 1 y afixedtaxproducedat least some short—run
suhstitutic::nawayfromemployment and toward increasedhours per
26wor I::sr[nip ii. Cl LI y the U I systom 1 ncreassd the speod c::-f dj ustment
emp1c:yment to chonccs i n product demand
Asafurthertest0± sr:meo-fthese i dsas I exami no dynamic
ompI oyment--outputandhc::urs-—outputrel atiOtis :i n twe]. vs OECD
countr:i. esThe purposeof thiscxercIse is tci extend andverify
Nickel 1 s (1979)sxarninotion of these rel ati orcshi ps -forthe U. K.I
concentrate on determining whetherandhow the rateo-f adjustmentto
changesin produc:t demand changedin the 1970s from what it had been
earlier. We have seen thatmanycountries adopted policies during
the 1970s that were desinnec:I to slow the adjustment o-f empi oyrnent to
output shoc:ks.At. the same time though, we know that. large
i ncreases occurred the price c-f energy which is a p—substi tute + or
labor. These changes may also have altered the lag structure in
empi oyment---output and hours—output rd ati ors (though there is no a
pri reason to believe this happened). All we can test,
therefore, is whether or not changes in lag structures occurred.
For each country with available data an integrated vector—
autoregression model was estimated for the manufacturing sector:
(3) = aY— + EbQ- ct +
where a, b and c are parameters; V is the dependent variable (in
logarithms) Q is the logarithm of output; t is a time trend and E
is a di sturbance term. The dependent variable V is either
emp]. oyment or total hours worked. For all couritri es the 'earl yU
time period ended in 1973 III and the lat.e' time period began with
1973:IV. This break point is. chosen to coincide with the first oil
shock. Obviously the timing of the impacts of job—security policies
differs in different c:ountries, and it would he more appropriate to
z.. psearch for structural changes in each country separately. Failing
that, we follow standard practice and use the oil shock to demarcate
the point at which the structure may have changed. For most
countries the initial observation in the early period is 1961:1, and
the final observation in the late time period is 19851j1ta
Theresults of estimating equation (5) are shown in Table 1.
In addition to the usual coefficients and t—statistics, the table
also shows: The chi—square statistic on the likelihood—ratio test
for including the vector of four terms in i0,...,3; Durbin's
(1970) h—statistic, distributed n(0,1)p and the estimated average
lag of adjustment of the dependent variable to an output shock. For
the six large countries the estimates are fairly satisfactory,
though there is some tendency for the h—statistic to reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the employment equations.
The average lag of employment adjustment in the six large countries
exceeds that of hours adjustment in eleven outofthe twelve pairs
of equations estimated. Among the six smaller countries the
estimates are either less precise (Greece and Finland) or imply lags
of ridiculous length (Ireland).
Recognizing that the application of a common specification to
data from a large number of economies will produce some anomalies,
it is still worthwhile examining common trends in the results. The
numbers without parentheses in Table 2 (from which Ireland is
excluded because the estimated lags made no sense) are totals
including only the six large countries, while those in parentheses
include all eleven countries. Considering only the employment—
output equations (the last line of the table), there is a tendency
28Table 1
Employment andHoursEquations, 12 OECD Countries
Most 1961:1—1973:111 and 1973:IV—1985:II --/
Pre—1973:IV Post-1973:III
Employment Hours Employment Hours
CANADA
E(—1) or EH(—1) .735 .740 .708 .711
(11.59) (9.145) (6.149) (6.511)
.3014 .319 .2'lO .262
(57.33) (50.28) (22.78) (31.35)
t —.00311 —.0038 —.0017 —.0019
(—14.53) (—3.40) (—3.09) (—2.93)
.996 .992 .905 .927
h .95 .55 1.16 1.56
Average lag 1.143 1.10 .99 .814
FRANCE
E(—1) or EH(—1) .923 .807 .817 .645
(18.95) (9.67) (10.55) (11.73)
3
.119 .0814 .063 .178
0 (13.72) (4.99) (16.38) (21.25)
t —.0016 —.0013 —.0013 —.0033
(—3.15) (—1.23) (—2.66) (—2.66)
.909 .710 .995 .995
h 2.78 .92 .17 .07
Average lag 8.07 3.1414 1.93 1.37Table 1 (cont'd.)
Employment and Hours Equations, 12 OECD Countries
Most 1961:1—1973:111 and 1973:IV—1985:II /
Pre—1973: IV Post—i 973:111
EmploymentHours Employment Hours
FEDERALREPUBLIC OF GERMANY
E(—1) or EH(—1) .71414 .678 .881 .1483
(10.32) (7.25) (35.92) (3.93)
.262 .582 .135 .2814
(65.60) (30.148) (98.20) (38.22)
t —.0027 —.0021 —.0007 —.0065
(—14.27) (—3.33) (_5147) (390)
.983 .977 .999 .918
h 1.29 .53 2.25 .21
Average lag 1.55 1.17 3.52 1.314
JAPAN
E(—1) or EH(—1) .909 .935 .985 .910
(76.86) (23.72) (49.143) (15.83)
3
.091 .067 .0145 .0111
0 (99.81) (—2.70) (514.15) (33.514)
t —.00211 —.0020 —.0003 —.0003
(—10.72) (—2.70) (—2.614) (—.78)
.999 .993 .993 9145
h .75 3.26 2.07 1.60
Average lag 14.86 6.29 31.20 14.13Table 1 (cont'd.)
Employment and Hours Equations, 12 OECD Countries










E(—1) or EH(—1) .687 .527 .898 .793
(6.92) (3.80) (30.86) (10.32)
3
.258 .14149 .1611 .280




(—3.81) (—3.55) (—11.148) (—2.89)
.960 .91414 .997 .986
h 1.39 1.86 2.60 .70
Average lag 2.58 1.11 3.58 1 .11
UNITED STATES
E(—1) or EH(—1) .889 .667 .983 .932
(15.514) (6.23) (23.32) (13.61)
3
t— .122 .319 .065 .075
0 (98.33) (85.27) (98.014) (91.02)
t —.0012 —.0029 —.0005 —.0005
(—3.09) (—3.20) (—2.57) (—1.51)
.997 •9914 .982 .971
h .99 1.65 .57 1.08
Averagelag 2.97 •149 27.50 5.80Table 1 (cont'd.)
Employment and Hours Equations, 12 OECD Countries




E(—1) orEH(—1) .150 .1148 .185 —.087
(.91) (.83) (1.20) (—.62)
.670 .14143 .1475 .622
(19.26) (10.09) (21.55) (18.148)
t —.0095 —.00140 .0008 —.0020
(—2.514) (—.97) (1.70) (—14.28)
.915 .900 .907 .768
h b b b 1.146
Average lag .87 .214 1.09 1.33
IRELAND
E(—1) orEH(—1) .656 .386 1.068 .995
(6.91) (2.86) (214.64) (15.07)
3
.3314 .1483 .070 .0148
0 (21.70) (114.88) (23.21) (10.51)
t —.0032 —.00147 —.0008 —.0007
(-2.82) (-2.21) (-3.17) (-1.142)
.989 .937 .952 .892
h 2.68 1.70 .148 1.114
Average lag 2.23 1.149 —9.05 98.82Table 1 (eont'd.)
Employment and Hours Equations, 12 OECD Countries
























Averagelag .72 2.16Table 1 (cont'd.)
Employment and Hours Equations, 12 OECD Countries
Most 1961:1—1973:111 and 1973:IV—1985:II /
Pre—1973: IV Post—i 973:111
Employment Employment
NETHERLANDS









Average lag 2.79 2.914
NORWAY









Average lag .19 2.58
t-statistics in parentheses, except 2() beneath the sum of coefficients
on the EQt.. (205() =9.1488;201() =13.277)
1-nV(b) < 0.-F cr th:' avoracfe I. ac c:+ ercpl c;,'ment. ad,.i '.kstment. 1:0 ave I. onthened ]. n
t.h-:-' 19/Os. The prc:babi 1 ity of observinq an increased laO in at
1 easl: ci cjht of el even couniri es is only 11 1 + the popul sti on
probabi 1 :i. t.y is 5 )However consi den no the x2 contingency table
for the seven countries for which both employment and hours
equat i onis are esti mated Ni ckei.Is reoul t that emp 1 oyment 1 ago have
1 enqthened hut hours 1 ago have shortened does not hold upThis
diversity of c:harmes in the average 1 e:ngth of adjustment 1 age is
observed in only l.:,wo of the seven countri
The reoLti tothis cxenci so are cons-i stent. wil:h the
hypoth€•?si. s that c.:hancjos in job —--sec:uri t.y p01 icy have induced ci ower
adjustment of emp 1 oyment chanoes to shocks to output dma.ndThey
are not consistent with the addi ti onal claim that the same policy
c:hanoes have encouraged empi c::ryers to adjust more rapidly along the
margin of hours per worker. Whether we have demonstrated anything
mc:'rthan a corre]. ati on of the cirowth of job--security policies with
increases in employment lags remains for other studies that ox amine
the effects o-f opec:i + Ic Job—security pal i CI CS on particular
economies and industries (for example1 Houseman 1986)
C.Indirect Costs
Whetherpoii c::iesthat alter ernpl oyers' behavi or in retai ni n
workers increase labor costs depends on whether the wago-seni ority
ri ati onshi p arises out of a seniority—productivity rel ationship. '
Evidence or- this issue is still sparse and deserves a more thorough
review than is possible here. The first empirical analysis (Medoff—
braham, 1980) suggested that. there is little rei ationship between
praduc:t I vi ty and seni or i. tyHowever more recent evidence onTable 2
Comparison of' Average Duration of' Adjustment Lag
(Number of Countries) /
Employment Total
Early > Late Early < Late
Early > Late 2 2
Hours
Early < Late 2 (3) 2 (3)
No hours equation (1) (3)
TOTAL 2 (3) 14(8)
Excludes Irelandsamples of fairly junior workers (Bishop—Stephenson, 1982, and
Brown, 1983) suggests that productivity increases with seniority at
least over the initial years of an employment relation; and evidence
on a sample that allows a direct measure of productivity (Maranto—
Rodgers, 1984) indicates that seniority and productivity are
positively related. The best conclusion at this point is that there
is a positive relation between seniority and productivity, but that
it may not be so strong as the wage—seniority relation.
There is remarkably little evidence on the employment effects
of specific policies that attempt to prevent layoffs by changing
indirect costs. Metcalf (1984) used cross—section British data on
industries to show that the Temporary Employment Subsidy succeeded
in reducing permanent layoffs. (His results also showedthatshort—
time compensation increased layoffs, a result that is hard to
credit.)As we saw in Section IV.B., Nickell (1982) demonstrated a
similar effect of unfair dismissal legislation in the U.K. The
difficulties with broad—brush empirical work that uses gross
measures in aggregate time—series equations to estimate the effects
of complex policies are by now well known. It seems clear that
serious evaluation of policies that affect indirect costs will
require both more detailed specification of the programs' parameters
anduse of more disaggregated data. At this point we simply have
very little information on the employment effectsof anti—layoff
programs that operate by affecting costs indirectly.
If markets workedwell,in the sense that information was
good, there would be little need for many of the programs
restricting employers' rights to lay off workers. For example, if
30workers kncw that apermanentlayoffis :imperidinq they will reduce
i.nvestmentin +i rm—specific capital to the poi nt where its value
j 11 be zerowhenthe layoff occurs. The cvi derce (Hamermesh1987)
indiL:atehoweverthat substantial firm—specific investment still
takesplaceimmediately before thelayoff1implying that workers
in-formationabout impendiriglayoffsis not very good. Thisinturn
suggeststhatrequiringprenotificationoflayoffscan prevent
uselessinvestment in firm—specificcapital arid can aid adjustment
byenc:ouraging workers to substitute general training that will make
subsequent 3Db search easier.Indeed, cvi dence for a particular
labor market (Foibre et a1 1984) and for a nationwide sample of
workers(Addison—F'ortuqal.1986) indicates that prenotification does
reduce the costs of dislocation.
D. Partial Coverage——Substitution of Unprotected forProtected
Workers
Therehave been no studies of whether protective legislation
covering only part of a economy has induced a rel aUye expansion of
theuncovered sector. However some impressionistic evidence does
existand there have been a fewstudies that allow us to infer the
extent to whichsubstitut. ion betweenthetypesof workers who are
protectedand unprotectedis possible. l 1 theevidencesuggests
that partial cc:iverage produces substantial substi tutionaway from
empi oymentinthe coveredsector.Gennard(1985) argues that
protective 1egi. slation and, more important increased noriwaqe costs
havc. rE?sul ted inan expansionof the sectors oftheBrit.ish economy
and the kinds.4:empi cymeritthatarenc'tcoveredbythe 1ccii sl ati on
and not: soheavilysub.j ec:tt o nonJage costs, %imi1 an y , in theFR3
henotesthat •firrnshavebeenspurred byemp 1 oyment reciul ati ontoLt-:-? TIer a sub c:n 1::. rcc: t inqandmcirapart—I.: i (flC:i.
Owen (1 97C/) Las cr os —'sect. a on data for the Uni tad StaLesi ri
197:: tc3 est imata th:: daq cec::-f subs titntion betwce n ft.i. I — and pan:
time workers, Ha + I nds that changes in their relative waneshave
I argE a+fec:ts oncalat.iyedemandThis sunc4ests though it. does not
ciernonstrata that pc:1i.ci as that 1 ncrecse the relative costs o-f
empl oyi. nO -fu]. 1—1:1. mc wor kane can prc:ciu.ce I arne reductions in thai r
amp]. oyrnent and 1 arge inc. r eases in the demand for part—timers.
Di snay—S::yszczal ( 1954) show thai: part—time empioymenl: in the U. K.
was shar1 y af + acted when 1 ECi1 si ati rn expandeci employment protect. i on
far part-ti ma workers. '
V.Conclusions
Themajor purpose of this discussion has been to analyze how
Job—security pa]. iries affect labor costs. Simple time—series or
c:rass—section regressions that I nd ucla the cxi stance or magnitude a-f
e:xpendi tures under a particular prc:nram c:annot. yield any useful
information about its a-f factsThose depend in a camp 1 cx way an how
the prociram affects c:osts; and, as we have seen, the paths through
which costs may h= changed are quite di verse. They include possible
a-f-f acts on the empi ciyrsent—hours rat I a, rn employment adjustment and
on the level of total labor input, through their effects on average
labor cc ;ts,
The cvi dance e.ucigests there is a short—run trada—of+ between
empl oyment and hours per worker, but that. in the Long run pal i c . es
thata-f -Fac:t the structure, as opposed to the level of labor cc.st.s
have only a el. I nht impac:ton em:1 oyment .They do, however, a-f-f act
the magni tucle c::+ adjustments I n ampi oyment in respc:nsE' to changes inproduct demand. When average labor costs are changed by job—
security policies, average levels of employment demand will change
through the standard routes of capital—labor substitution and scale
effects. Not all job—security policies impose costs that reduce
total labor demands To the extent that policies provide information
that functions as a public good (such as prenotification of
impending layoffs), they may increase labor—market efficiency.
However, the role of job—security policies in reducing total worker—
hours, should not be ignored: Studies that are relevant to
assessing the impact of job—security policies on the mix of
employment and hours are not conclusive, but those that allow us
infer their effects on total worker—hours are.
The discussion in Section IV makes it apparent how little we
know about how job—security programs in general affect labor costs,
and what the impacts of particular policies have been. The few
studies of job—security policies that were enacted in the
industrialized countries during the 1970s and early 1980s do suggest
they achieved their aims, but at the expense of reducing total
worker—hours in protected employment. Better evidence is provided
by studies of the impact of labor costs more generally: These
suggest that the policies could have produced some short—run
increase in employment. Given the lengths of lags in adjustment,
though, the evidence indicates that it is unlikely they induced a
substitution of employment for hours that lasted beyond several
years. Moreover, to the extent that they raised labor costs, as
most did, they contributed to a decline in total worker—hours
through the elasticity of demand for labor services.
33The discussion ofthetheory of labor costs and the evidence
on it imply that job—security policies can induce a temporary
substitution of employment for hours, and can permanently mitigate
short—run employment fluctuations ———bothdecreases and increases
in employment. They accomplish this at the cost of reducing the
equilibrium level of labor input and of output. They thus offer an
industrialized economy a choice between greater employment stability
(with fewer total hours worked on average) and greater employment
fluctuations Cwith more total hours worked on average). Moreover,
to the extent they cover only part of the labor market, they help
create a two-tier labor market consisting of secure Jobs in a
declining sectorandinsecure Jobs in an expanding sector.
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38FOOTNOTES
1 Seen forexampleGennard (1979) and (1985),
2Though this laststatement is not quite correct, the law
ceilingonthetaxable base underthisprogram makes this component
of payroll costs function essentially as a fixed cost per worker.
3. Evidence (Hamermesh 1986) on the separability of capital
•fjomlabor subgroups suggests, though that thisassumptionis not
right,though it is unknown whether the evidence generalizes to
employment—hourssubst i tuti on
4.Hart (1984) analyzes a wide variety of these combinations.
5.Inthis section I usually ignore general—equilibrium im-
pacts of these payments that work through labor supply to the firm.
6.This exposition is based on Hamermesh—Rees (1984).
7. However, the original analysis of this problem (Halt
a, 1960) did examine these asymmetries.
8.See, fcir example, Mincer—Jovanovic (1981) or Mitchell
(1902) for evidence ofanegative effect of tenure onthequit
probability, other things equal.
9.As we discuss in Section II.D. below, this is a general
implication of the partial coverage of protective legislation.
10.See WallStreetJournal, April22,1986, page 1.
11.This equation has little basis in economic theory
becauseiti cinores fixedlaborcosts (or assumes implicitly that
they are constant overtimerwhich is clearly incorrect) and because
i. t I rid udes as independent van abl es both employment and output.
12, However,Nissi m also hasthe strancie result that the1 ag
of skilled—workeremployment behind changes in skilled workE?rs'
wages i s shorterthanthe ad.i ustmEnt lag of unski1led employment
behindchanges in unskilled wages. This resultis inconsistent
wi ththe findings on lags bhi nd output in the same study.
13The exceptions area France, with the late time pe'ri ad
ending in i984 IV; Greece and the Uni ted Ki ncidom, wi t.h the early
pen cd becji nni ng I n i963 Ithe Nether 1 ands, with the late per i ad
endi nc in 1 985'r Iand Norway for whi c:hobservatiensf or 1971 I—
1972I I .E are excluded because of missing data.
14. Despite one recent argument. to the contrary (Al toni i —
sd nt c. 1' 5 we sum h 1 h ue—se n nr it rE] t i nnshi p i
not rnerei y a anti fact resulting from incorrectly analyzed data,
15.F!ecause thestudyI. acks a sati s+ actory rel at. i ye price
vanableand uses interact.i on terms w t.hout the matchi nc mai n—effect
van abi es, the results in Di sney—Szyszczak 1984) are less rdable
than those i ri many cf the other studi es di scussed i n thi s survsy.
—39—APPENDIX
Let the firm maximize:
(1) [F(L) -wL-C(L)]ertdt
where L =laborinput, w =costper unit of labor services, r is the firm's
discount rate, C(L) is the adjustment cost, and I have assumed labor is the
only input in a production function F, with F' > 0, F'' < 0. Assume that the
marginal cost of adjustment can be increasing and in particular that. C is
quadratic:
(2)C(L) =at+bL2 ,a> 0, b0
(The marginal cost of adjustment is then 2bL +a.)The Euler equation
describing the firm's profit—maximizing path is:
(3) 2bL —2brL+F'(L)—w—ra=0
where L denotes d2L/dt2.
If b > 0, the steady state is described by L =L=0and L* such that:
*
(14)F'(L)= w+ra.
(This is the standard marginal—productivity condition for labor demand, with
*
theuser—cost of adjustment added.) Assume that the firm has L =L0at
t =0,and that w increases. The new equilibrium is shown as L* in Figure
—40—A.l. The line along which L =0is negatively sloped, for as L increases in
* *
(3),F'(L) decreases, as must L. The adjustment path from to L is
indicated by the arrow. A similar analysis applies if the firm begins
at L1, and is then shocked at t =0by a wage decrease.
If b =0,the marginal cost of adjustment is constant in L, and (4) holds
for all t.Thus any change in w causes the firm to adjust instantaneously to
the new L* that satisfies (4). That this is true when b =0,but adjustment
is slow when b > 0, shows that a more rapid increase in the marginal cost
as L increases reduces the rate of adjustment. A higher marginal cost of
adjustment--a--reduces L*, as does a higher discount rate. Employment on
average is lower where adjustment costs are greater.
That greater adjustment costs reduce employment fluctuations when shocks
occur can be seen by assuming the firm is in equilibrium at t =0,given w0,




-aL-bL]e_rtdt + [F(L) -
w0
-aL-bL}e_rt
Since the firm's adjustment is slower when b is greater, the shock to w will
result in a smaller movement away from L0 by t =Tthan if b were smaller. If
b =0the firm will choose either to maintain L =L0
for all t, or to jump
to L1 at t =0,then jump back to L0 at t =T.With constant marginal
adjustment costs the fluctuation will be the same size if it occurs; but the
employer's willingness to vary L at all decreases as a is larger.
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